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Project(s)

Our research, at the intersection of philosophy and biology, aims to explore an under-studied aspect of animal agency – inventiveness – and to investigate its role in evolution.

The traditional conception of evolutionary theory, which views organisms as passively shaped by natural selection, is increasingly being challenged. It is now becoming clear that the behaviour of non-human organisms, particularly of animals, plays a significant role in evolutionary processes. This shift has sparked a growing interest, in biology, in animals’ non-innate behaviours, such as innovations, learned behaviours, and the development of cultural traits. At the same time, this transformation in evolutionary theory has inspired philosophical inquiries into non-human agency.

 

However, these two fields of research—biology and philosophy—remain largely disconnected, failing to address some crucial questions.

In philosophy, biological agency is typically defined as an organism’s ability to select, from a genetically determined set of behaviours, the one most appropriate to its goals. This perspective overlooks animals’ inventiveness and ultimately diminishes their agency, as both the behavioural repertoire and the organism’s goals can ultimately be explained by natural selection.

In biology, recent research on acquired behaviours has mostly focused on how these behaviours are transmitted (such as through social learning and imitation), on genetic and cultural co-evolution, or on modelling innovations (successful inventions that have spread within a population). However, we still know very little about the process of invention itself. Additionally, researchers from different fields have been studying inventions in various species without a shared conceptual framework. This lack of consensus on the concept of invention hinders comparative analysis.

 

Our crossdisciplinary research explores this under-studied aspect of animal agency – inventiveness. We aim to question the meaning of the concept, investigate the invention process through playful behaviours, and assess its link to adaptability.

1.The first step is conceptual: we will develop a definition of inventiveness that considers the different criteria used by researchers, while allowing for comparative analysis. This will also lead us to rethink animal agency in a way that recognises the active role animals play in shaping their own behaviours. This initial phase will involve reviewing ethological literature to establish a comprehensive definition of invention effectively bringing together existing findings, while critically reviewing philosophical research on agency.

2. The second step is observational: we will analyse the invention process by observing chacma baboons during play – the focus on play being motivated by the behavioural flexibility exhibited in playful activities. The goal is to identify inventions, determine common traits among inventors, and explore whether certain contexts are more conducive to inventiveness.

3. The third step is experimental: we will design an experiment to assess the link between invention and adaptability. Our aim is to determine whether there is a correlation between playful inventiveness and the inventiveness required for problem-solving, and more broadly, for developing new functional, ‘adaptive’ behaviours.

We hope this research will deepen our understanding of animal inventiveness, shedding new light on animal agency, while grounding it empirically. Rather than providing definitive conclusions, this project seeks to open new perspectives, integrating diverse research fields. Furthermore, it encourages reflection on animal creativity and perhaps a more serious consideration of the role animals play in ecological and evolutionary dynamics.

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